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COMMENTS
TRADE SECRETS AFTER PATENT PUBLICATION:
A PUNITIVE INJUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Comparison of trade secret and patent cases provides an interesting study
in judicial subjectivism. The most cursory review of the cases reveals that one
who would assert his rights based upon a patent is a monopolist, an anomoly
in our antitrust society, and as such is granted relief only to the extent that his
rights are indefeasibly vested by statute. On the other hand, plaintiffs who
complain that trade secrets have been wrongfully appropriated are made
special wards of equity under the guise of "enforcing increasingly higher stan-
dards of fairness or commercial morality in trade."'
This difference in judicial approach is all the more curious when viewed
objectively. The patentee himself had a trade secret when he first developed
the substance of his patent. However, instead of suppressing his discovery, he
chose to dedicate it to the "progress of science," 2 reserving to himself a statu-
tory monopoly for a limited time.3 On the other hand, the trade secret plaintiff
attempts to conceal his discovery-forever, if possible. To him, selfish economic
considerations outweigh his devotion to the "progress of science."
All this talk about "the progress of science" is admittedly idealistic. As a
practical matter, our hypothetical patentee could probably "care less" about
the progress of science, being just as self-interested as his trade secret counter-
part. However, by detaching ourselves from personal motives, we may decide
who should receive judicial protection; then, when we turn to the practical
side of the law, it is surprising to find that, in fact, judicial sympathy is
contrary to our objective conclusion.
It is not the purpose of this discussion to justify or condemn this apparent
divergence between logic and fact. It is suggested, however, that it results from
a desire to punish wrongdoers, even if an extension of the conventional limits
of civil remedies is necessary to do so. What concerns us here, more important
than the reason for a judicial attitude, is its effect. In the area of trade secret
remedies, the result in some cases has been an overzealous use of the injunc-
tion, with relief being extended to the plaintiff subsequent to the grant of a
patent whereby he has disclosed his secret to the world. In such a case, it
1. The entire statement is often quoted by the courts and made the basis for equitable
protection: "[T]he tendency of the law, both legislative and common, has been in the
direction of enforcing increasingly higher standards of fairness or commercial morality
in trade." Restatement, Torts, Introductory Note ch. 35, at 540 (1938).
2. The purpose of the patent statutes is expressed in the Constitution as follows: "The
Congress shall have power ...To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries ... " U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1958) defines the nature and duration of a patent grant.
313
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
would seem at first glance that since the secret no longer exists, there is no
further need to protect it. Yet, there is a line of cases dating back to 1934
that does just that.
It may be advisable to describe more clearly the situation in which such a
case arises. First of all, the plaintiff has a trade secret, which is defined as
a new process, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those to
whom it has necessarily been confided. It must be kept in substantial secrecy
but need not be patentable.4 Next, the defendant wrongfully appropriates the
plaintiff's trade secret by putting it to his own use after having received it
either in confidence' or by wrongful means.6 Then, some time after the de-
fendant learns the secret, it is disclosed in a patent granted to the plaintiff.
The situation which results varies, depending upon whether the patent is valid
or invalid, and whether the substance of the secret is claimed or merely dis-
closed without being claimed.7 However, the factor upon which the courts
have placed the greatest weight is whether the defendant's misappropriation
occurred before or after the issuance of the plaintiff's patent. In a somewhat
analogous case, the secret may also be published in a periodical, or it may be
embodied in a product publicly used or sold, whereby the secret is capable of
being discovered by mere inspection.
Under these circumstances some courts, in what has become known as the
Shellmar8 line of cases, have ignored the plaintiff's patent publication and held
that one to whom the secret has been disclosed in confidence is bound by an
implied promise not to use or disclose the secret even after the owner has dis-
closed it to the general public. To enforce this implied promise, these cases grant
a perpetual injunction against use of the secrets by the confidential disclosee.
Opposed to these decisions is what has become known as the Conmar0 line
of cases. These cases hold that the disclosee's duty terminates with public
disclosure of the secret by its owner.
4. For a more complete definition see Restatement, Torts § 757, comment b, at 5-8
(1939). The novelty requirements for trade secrets are discussed in Ellis, Trade Secrets
34-55 (1953).
5. Most frequently in the reported cases such secrets were entrusted to the defendant as
employee of the plaintiff, or in the course of the negotiation or performance of a contract,
such as a license agreement between the parties.
6. "Wrongful means" encompasses just about any unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff's
privacy. By far the most popular method used is to induce the plaintiff's employees to
breach their confidential duty to the plaintiff.
7. The law requires that a patent specification be concluded by one or more claims
which particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1958).
The scope of the protection accorded to a patentee is measured by the claims. L. S. Donald-
son Co. v. La Maur, Inc., 299 F.2d 412, 417 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 815 (1962).
8. Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 695 (1937).
9. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
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II. THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS
Before discussing the Shellmar and Conmar lines of cases in more detail, it
may be well to discuss what would appear to be the plaintiff's rights and
remedies under the facts of these cases.
Prior to publication, the owner of a trade secret retains a proprietary interest
in the secret which is protected by law and equity against misappropriation.' 0
However, others are free to discover and use the secret so long as they do not
use unlawful means." The owner of a trade secret retains an interest in that
secret after publication only if he obtains a patent on the subject matter of
the secret either coincidentally with the publication or at some later date.'2 In
all other instances of publication, the trade secret is dedicated to the public
and may be used by the general public with impunity. In fact, if the owner
has concealed his secret and the publication is made by a third party who,
working independently, discovers and patents it, that third party obtains a
right to make, use and sell the substance of the secret to the exclusion of the
original discoverer.' 3
The most important type of publication is one whereby the substance of
the trade secret is described in a patent granted to the owner. Here, the owner
retains no interest in the secret unless the secret is defined by the claims of the
patent. Thus, if the secret is disclosed but not claimed, it is dedicated to the
public.' 4 Furthermore, the owner retains an interest in a claimed secret only
if the patent is valid.' 5
The interest retained in a secret disclosed and claimed in a valid patent is
"the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention through-
out the United States" for the term of seventeen years.10 This right has been
limited to excluding only commercial manufacture, use or sale. Thus, it has
been held not to extend to use in research, on the theory that such a construc-
tion would frustrate "the progress of science and useful arts."' 7
The right of others to use patented inventions in research is not to be dis-
paraged. For example, competitors may patent improvements on a basic inven-
10. See, e.g., Bohlman v. American Paper Goods Co., 53 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1943),
and cases cited therein.
11. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
12. An inventor must apply for a patent in the United States within one year after the
invention is described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or is in public
use or on sale in this country. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
13. Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86 (D.C. Cir. 1898).
14. Underwood v. Gerber, 149 U.S. 224, 231 (1893); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S.
419, 423-24 (1891); Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881).
15. A patent is presumed valid and the burden of establishing invalidity is on the party
asserting it. However, when so proven, invalidity is a defense to an action for infringement.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
17. E.g., Chesterfield v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 838, 846, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375-76
.L958) (per curiam). See also Katz Mfg. Co. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679, 680
(2d Cir. 1963); Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aft'd, 156
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1946).
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tion, or possibly new and useful ways of making or using the patented product.
Each such patent reduces the scope and value of the original patent and may
restrict the right of the original inventor to practice his own invention. At the
same time, these subsequent patents put competitors in a better position to
enter into licensing or cross-licensing agreements with the holder of the dominant
patent. Although this may seem to be an unjust whittling away of the rights
of the original inventor, it actually stimulates competition and prevents a seven-
teen-year moratorium in the area covered by the patent. Thus, it truly aids the
realization of the constitutional purpose.' 8
The possibility-indeed, probability-of such outside research activity is one
of the burdens that an inventor must expect when he resorts to the protection of
the patent statutes. If, on the other hand, he conceals his invention, no one will
have the information necessary to practice it, in research or otherwise, and such
use by a misappropriator can be enjoined.
III. THE PLAINTIFF'S REMEDIES
In a suit for misappropriation of an unpublished trade secret, the plaintiff is
entitled to damages and a permanent injunction against disclosure or adverse
use.' 9 Such an injunction is broad enough to include noncommercial use; and
it would be futile for a defendant, under the disability of such an injunction, to
try to assert a later-obtained improvement patent against the original plaintiff
in a subsequent suit. 0
In a suit for patent infringement, on the other hand, the plaintiff is entitled
to damages 21 and an injunction "to prevent the violation of any right secured
18. See note 2 supra. A good example of the significance of extra-commercial activity
is provided by the present polypropylene patent situation in the United States. DuPont,
while not engaged in the commercial manufacture of polypropylene, is apparently in a very
strong patent position in that field and recently entered into a cross-licensing agreement
with Montecatini, one of eight domestic manufacturers and a contender with DuPont
and three others for the basic composition-of-matter patent. Hope Glimmers in PP Patent
Snarl, Chemical Week, June 15, 1963, p. 21.
19. See Reynolds v. Whitin Mach. Works, 167 F.2d 78, 88 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 844 (1948) ; Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 Fed. 911, 913 (6th Cir. 1919) ;
Ojala v. Bohlin, 124 U.S.P.Q. 526 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare
241, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (V. Ch. 1851). Cf. E. I. DuPont DeNemours Powder Co. v. Masland,
244 U.S. 100 (1917) ; Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905) ;
Simmons Medicine Co. v. Simmons, 81 Fed. 163, 166 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1897). See generally
1 Nims, Unfair Competition & Trade Marks § 143(a), at 409 (4th ed. 1947); Restate-
ment, Torts § 757, comment e, at 10 (1939).
20. Being unable to disclose the basic secret, one would be unable to patent an im-
provement upon that secret. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1958). Use of an improved process would
subject the user to liability the same as use of the original secret. Protexol Corp. v. Koppers
Co., 229 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum); Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Chem.
Works, 20 F.2d 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1927). See generally Restatement, Torts § 757, comment
c, at 9 (1939). Courts deny relief in patent infringement suits where the plaintiff is guilty
of "unclean hands." Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589, 600 (9th Cir. 1957). See
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1958) (includes discretionary provision for treble damages).
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by patent."2 This, of course, means an injunction of limited scope and dura-
tion, measured by the rights of the plaintiff under the patent.m
What, then, is the proper remedy in an action for misappropriation of a trade
secret which is patented prior to judgment? More specifically, what injunctive
relief is the plaintiff entitled to-that appropriate to a trade secret action, that
appropriate to a patent suit, or none at all until he has put his patent in suit
and tested its validity? This discussion will concern the proper remedy in the
case where publication is made in a patent which discloses and claims the secret,
as it is here that the plaintiff would seem to have the greatest rights after publica-
tion.
As previously stated, the cases on this subject fall into two groups, the Shlmar
line, holding that the plaintiff is entitled to the same injunctive relief he would
get in the absence of a publication, and the Conmar line, holding that the plain-
tiff is relegated to his remedy under the patent statutes. These two lines of cases,
however, are not completely contradictory. In each Shebnar case, the misappro-
priation took place prior to issuance of the patent, while in the Conmar cases,
there was no use of the information obtained in confidence until after issuance of
the plaintiff's patent.24 Thus, the defendant, according to the time of his trans-
gression, is categorized as either a "defaultant fiduciary"2 5 or one who "had the
fiduciary status and faithfully maintained it,' 20 and is treated accordingly. While
these two lines of cases may appear to be complimentary, the reasoning espoused
in the Shellnuzr line is incompatible with that of the Conmar line. The proper
use of the injunction is to protect future rights as opposed to punishing previous
wrongs,27 and it would seem that the future rights of the plaintiff are the same in
both cases. It is therefore submitted that the injunctive relief granted by the
Shellar cases, insofar as it extends beyond the rights of the plaintiff which
survive publication of the patent, is a misuse of the injunctive power of a court
of equity. Such relief protects no right and is therefore punitive in nature. Al-
though equity has the power to assess punitive damages,28 it does not have the
22. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1958). Also, in exceptional cases the court may award attorney's
fees to the prevailing party. 35 US.C. § 285 (1958).
23. See Freedman v. Friedman, 242 F.2d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 1957).
24. There have been attempts to harmonize these lines of cases on the basis of the dis-
tinction of whether the tort occurred before or after issuance of the patent. See Gallowhur
Chem. Corp. v. Schwerdle, 37 N.J. Super. 385, 397-98, 117 A.2d 416, 423 (Ch. 1955);
Comment, Relief in Trade Secret Cases After Patent Publication, 5 Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright J. of Research and Education 70 (1961).
25. Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 18 N.J. 467, 475, 114 Aid 438,
442, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955).
26. Gallowhur Chem. Corp. v. Schwerdle, 37 N.J. Super. 385, 399, 117 A.2d 416, 424
(Ch. 1955).
27. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928); J. C. McFarland Co. v.
O'Brien, 6 F.2d 1016, 1018 (NJ). Ohio 1925); May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v.
Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331, 343, 26 N.E.2d 279, 284 (1940).
28. I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park So. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 461, 228 N.YS.2d
883 (1st Dep't 1962), 31 Fordham L. Rev. 825 (1963).
1963] COMMENTS
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
right or power to invoke the extraordinary remedy of injunction 20 to effectuate
such a purpose.
A. The "Shellmar" Line
The Shellmar line of cases dates back to A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron
Works Co.30 in 1934. In that case, the defendant hired an employee of the plain-
tiff for the purpose of obtaining knowledge of secret welding processes used in
the manufacture of a patented oil still. The district court referred the trade
secret suit for damages and an injunction to a Master along with a related suit
for infringement of the oil still patent. By the time the Master submitted his
report, some of the twelve secret processes in suit had been disclosed and claimed
in patents issued to the plaintiff, while others were the subject of applications
pending before the Patent Office. The district court issued an injunction restrain-
ing the defendant from the use of only the unpatented secrets.3' The sixth circuit
affirmed the court below, authorizing further limitation of the injunction on
remand if the district court should find that any other secrets had been subse-
quently patented.32 The court proceeded on the theory that the plaintiff had
elected to seek protection of his other secrets under the patent statutes.33 How-
ever, on rehearing and without elaborating, the court decided that since the de-
fendant had obtained the information covered by the patents by inducing a breach
of confidence, it would be estopped from contesting the validity of these patents.
On this basis, in order to save the plaintiff from the burden of a second suit for
infringement of patented processes in which it had already established its pro-
prietary rights, the court modified its previous opinion and extended the in-
junction against infringement to all processes involved in the trade secret suit,
whether covered by patent or not.3 4
The rule of this case appears to be in line with other estoppels which arise in
patent cases.35 One of the unfortunate circumstances resulting from a judicial
declaration of patent invalidity is the inability of the court to do what the Patent
Office can do3 -return to the inventor the consideration he paid for the patent,
29. Ibid. Cf. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 490 (1925).
30. 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934), modified and aff'd on rehearing, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1935).
31. A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 12 U.S.P.Q. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1932).
32. 73 F.2d at 539.
33. Id. at 537.
34. 74 F.2d at 935.
35. A licensee is estopped to contest the validity of the licensed patent. Hall Labs., Inc.
v. National AIuminate Corp., 224 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932
(1956); National Transformer Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1954).
An assignor of a patent is estopped to deny its validity. Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v.
Ordnance Gauge Co., 213 F.2d 503, 507 (3d Cir. 1954); United States Appliance Corp. v.
Beauty Shop Supply Co., 121 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 680 (1941). One
who appropriates the teaching of a patent is estopped to deny its utility. United States
Gypsum Co. v. Consolidated Expanded Metal Cos., 130 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 698 (1943).
36. All pending and abandoned patent applications are maintained in confidence and
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i.e., the secrecy of his development. Whether or not a court would, if it were
possible, return the contents of an invalid patent to the status of secrecy is
moot; certainly the equities of the circumstance would favor such action. In
view of the inability of the court to make such restoration, denying the wrong-
doer the right to tear away the last veil of protection left to the plaintiff-
the prima fade validity of his patent-leaves the defendant under no greater
burden than he bargained for.
3 7
Thus, the inclusion of the patented secrets within the scope of the injunction,
thereby avoiding a second trial in which the issues would already have been
settled by estoppel, was a proper disposal of the appeal. One can only wonder if
the court used the term infringement in the decree as a word of art. In retrospect,
it is hoped that it did.38
The next case, Sheilmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co.,30 arose out of a bill
to modify an injunction which proscribed the use of certain trade secrets by
the petitioner, on the ground that some of the secrets involved had been subse-
quently disclosed to the public in various patents.40 The court, relying on the
holding of A. 0. Smith, held that while the issuance of the patent enabled the
whole world to infringe it at the risk of being sued by Allen-Qualley, Shellmar
was disabled by the earlier decree. 41 Here again the court stressed its unwilling-
ness to force Allen-Qualley to bring another suit to enforce its previously estab-
lished rights, especially since Shellmar was in no position to defend itself in view
of the rule set out in A. 0. Smith. The court held, therefore, that Shellmar had
failed to establish a right to modification of the original injunction.42 It is inter-
esting to note that the injunction forbade Shellmar to make, use or sell the
product-the same language used to define the present statutory patent rights
43
cannot, with certain exceptions, be seen without the consent of the applicant. 35 U-S.C.
§ 122 (1958). See also United States Patent Office Rules of Practice, Rule 14, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.14 (Supp. 1963). However, upon issue of the patent the secret is published to the world.
37. There is some doubt as to how widely this rule has been followed. It was followed
by the seventh circuit in Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Prods. Co., 31 F.2d 293 (ND. Ill.),
aff'd, 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929). However, it was rejected by the seventh circuit in Smith
v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953), where the court relied on Booth v. Stutz
Motor Car Co, 56 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1932), and Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F2d
921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952). It should be noted that in each of the
cases relied on there was no commercial use of the secret prior to issue of the patent.
38. This construction was given to the decree in A. 0. Smith by Judge Simons in
Detachable Bit Co. v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 133 F.2d 632, 637 (6th Cir. 1943)
(dictum). Judge Simons also wrote the opinion in A. 0. Smith.
39. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937).
40. The injunction had been issued in a prior suit charging that the defendant had
learned the secrets in the course of negotiating a contract and had put them to its own
use after the negotiation was broken off. Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Prods. Co., 31
F.2d 293 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929).
41. 87 F.2d at 108.
42. 87 F.2d at 108-10.
43. At the time of decision the statutory language of the patent right was "to make,




-or to use, reveal or make known the process and machinery used. It is at least
arguable that the court considered the injunction to be no broader than Allen-
Qualley's rights under the patent, and that therefore Shellmar's petition, made
prior to the expiration of the patent, was premature.
One aspect of this case may explain the confusion in some of the later cases.
It appears that after Shellmar had learned the secrets in confidence, it caused
a search of the art to be made in the Patent Office, from which it was discovered
that the secret infringed an unexpired patent issued to one Olsen. In violation of
its confidential relationship to the plaintiff, Shellmar purchased the Olsen patent
for its own account. The trial court in the original action directed him to assign
the Olsen patent to Allen-Qualley upon payment of the price it had paid for it.44
The court held, as others have before and since, 4" that the fact that the secret
was substantially disclosed in a prior patent to another did not render the subject
matter incapable of being treated as a trade secret.40 If the owner of the secret
believes his improvement to be new and it is in fact unknown to the confidential
disclosee and others similarly situated, then the secret is entitled to protection
by a court of equity, and the disclosee will not be allowed to show that what he
has learned in confidence was previously available to him. The distinction lies
in the source of the publication. If it was made by the one who later asserts a
proprietory interest in the invention as a trade secret, the publication will defeat
his right to protection. On the other hand, if the prior publication was by another,
the plaintiff may establish his property rights by showing that the publication
was not known to others in the community, trade, or geographical section of the
country.47
With regard to the prior Olsen patent, the court stated that the "appellant by
its inequitable conduct had taken itself outside the pale of the general public to
which the disclosure of that patent was made." 48 This language is inaccurate.
The defendant could not avail itself of the Olsen patent because it learned of
the subject matter in confidence; and to allow defendant to defeat the plaintiff's
rights through a betrayal of that confidence would be unjust. The defendant
would be unable to assert the Olsen patent whether or not it was guilty of
inequitable conduct. Errors such as this, though slight, are unfortunate when
they appear in what has proved to be such an important case. In our system of
stare decisis, words are often quoted out of context and it is quite likely that the
patent referred to in the above quote has often been confused with the plaintiff's
later patent. Indeed, the rule of the Shellmar line of cases is generally considered
44. Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Prods. Co., 31 F.2d 293, 297 (N.D. Ill.), af'd, 36 F.2d
623 (7th Cir. 1929).
45. Probably the leading case on this point is Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.
1953). See also Ellis, op. cit. supra note 4, § 22.
46. 31 F.2d at 297.
47. Just what prior knowledge is necessary to defeat a claimed trade secret is difficult
to pin down. In the recent case Kamin v. Kuhnau, 222 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d 912 (1962),
the Oregon Supreme Court protected the plaintiff's secret although it apparently was known
to the trade outside the locality in which plaintiff and defendant operated.
48. 87 F.2d at 107.
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to be that the defendant, by his wrongful conduct, is denied the right of the
general public to avail itself of the disclosure of the plaintiff's patent.4 9
Among the cases which follow or reject Shellinar, the decisions in New Jersey
provide an interesting study. The cases in that state seem to follow Shellmar or
Conmar depending upon whether the defendant used the secrets before or after
their disclosure.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Mark-
ing Corp.,50 affirmed a lower court decision awarding damages and an injunction
which was not limited to the plaintiff's patent rights.5' In its decision, the court
directed its full attention to the question of whether or not the plaintiff's pre-
existing cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets survived the issu-
ance of his patent disclosing them. The court decided that it did, giving all the
usual reasons: (1) it was not concerned with the rights of the public generally;
(2) the need for commercial morality; and (3) the unnecessary burden on
plaintiff if he has to sue again on his patent. However, there was no mention,
on appeal, of the scope or duration of the injunction.
Three other New Jersey decisions in which the defendant had begun use of
the secret after publication follow the Conmar line.52 In holding that only an
express agreement to honor plaintiff's secret after publication would be enforced
by injunction, they strike at the very heart of the SheIlmar line, which is an
implied promise to honor the plaintiff's secret.
The Texas case of Hyde Corp. v. Huffines53 settled any doubts about the in-
tended scope of injunctions issued in the Shellnar line of cases. That case grew
out of a one-year exclusive license agreement under which Hyde was to make
and sell garbage trucks equipped with Huffines' compressor mechanism, then the
subject of a United States patent application. The contract provided for auto-
matic renewal from year to year " 'for the pendency of said patent application or
applications, and for the life of any patent or patents that may issue there-
from.' ',54 After two years, Hyde repudiated the contract but continued to manu-
facture the trucks on his own. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals issued a
perpetual injunction against the defendant's use of the contents of the original
49. Such confusion certainly is indicated by the following quote from Judge Learned
Hand's decision in the Conmar case: "The Seventh Circuit, and apparently the Sixth as
well, have, however, held that if before issue one has unlawfully obtained and used in-
formation which the specifications later disclose, he will not be free to continue to do so
after issue; his wrong deprives him of the right which he would otherwise have had as
a member of the public." 172 F.2d at 155. See also Picard v. United Aircraft Corp, 128
F.2d 632, 637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942).
50. 18 N.J. 467, 114 A.2d 438, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955).
S1. Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 35 N.J. Super. 333, 346 (Ch.
1954) (semble).
52. Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 202
(3d Cir. 1960); Darsyn Labs., Inc. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 120 F. Supp. 42 (D.N.J.), affd
per curiam, 217 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955); Gallowhur
Chem. Corp. v. Schwerdle, 37 N.J. Super. 385, 117 A.2d 416 (Ch. 1955).
53. 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.V.2d 763, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
54. Id. at 573, 314 S.V.2d at 767-68.
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application. It is interesting to note that the injunction had a greater duration
than the express contract of the parties.
The Texas Supreme Court, in affirming the court of civil appeals, formulated
what has been called the "head start" doctrine. This doctrine grants to the
plaintiff injunctive protection surviving the issuance of the patent on the theory
that, unlike the general public, the defendant has had a marketing head start.
In formulating the theory, the court seemed more concerned with the in-
junction's survival upon issuance of the patent than its status at the expiration
of the patent, relying heavily on the Adolph Gottcho case. The court considered
the possibility of a limited injunction and rejected it on the grounds that: (1)
defendant didn't properly raise the issue;56 and (2) there was no showing of
an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in issuing a perpetual injunction, the
normal form of injunction used in a trade secret case.
Kamin v. Kuhnau,57 the most recent of the Shellmar cases, was decided last
year by the Oregon Supreme Court. That case involved the construction of
garbage trucks with hydraulically operated plows for packing the garbage. It
appears that the defendant had contracted to build such trucks for the plaintiff,
both parties operating under the assumption that the device was new and novel.
The court found that the disclosure was made "under such circumstances as to
raise an implication of a promise" by the defendant not to misappropriate the
plaintiff's secret.58
After the defendant had made a number of trucks for the plaintiff, he termi-
nated the relationship and began manufacture of the trucks on his own. The
plaintiff's secret was later patented, but he elected to sue the defendant in the
state court for misappropriation of his trade secret, rather than test his patent in
a federal court.
The Oregon court quickly aligned itself with "the cases adopting the higher
standard of 'commercial morality' [which] emphasize the breach of the confidence
reposed in the defendant, rather than the existence of the trade secret."5 09 The
court relied heavily on the Hyde case in sustaining the right of the plaintiff to
a perpetual injunction.
B. The "Conmar" Line
As previously stated, the Conmar line6" does not present facts identical to
the Shellmar cases. In each of the Conmar cases the defendant did not put the
55. Just what kind of a "head start" the court had in mind is not clear. In its opinion
the court called it a marketing head start. Id. at 581, 314 S.W.2d at 773. In the court's
discussion of the motion for rehearing it was referred to as a manufacturing head start.
Id. at 588, 314 S.W.2d at 778.
56. It was apparently raised in a brief filed amicus curiae. 158 Tex. at 585, 314 S.W.2d
at 776.
57. 232 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d 912 (1962).
58. Id. at 146, 155, 374 P.2d at 916, 920. It appears that such a construction was pre-
viously used elsewhere in the country, but not in Portland or the surrounding area.
59. Id. at 151, 374 P.2d at 918.
60. The following cases are included in the Conmar line: Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp.,
164 F. Supp. 41 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960); Darsyn Labs., Inc. v.
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secret to commercial use until after issuance of the patent.01 The cases recognized
that had there been use prior to patenting the defendant would have been held
to account for such use. 62 However, in the absence of an express agreement not
to use the secrets after publication by the plaintiff, the court would not imply
such an agreement. 63 Thus, the courts reject the Shellmar cases by relegating
the plaintiff to his patent rights and allowing the defendant to defend the in-
fringement suit like any other member of the public. Plaintiff's remedies are
thereby restricted to those provided by the patent statutes.
C. Analysis of the "Shellmar" Line
It is submitted that the Shellmar cases are irreconcilable with the Conmar
cases. Although the facts of the cases are distinguishable, the difference cannot
justify issuance of a more severe injunction where the defendant's misappropria-
tion occurred prior to issuance of the patent.
Injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should issue only where irrepa-
rable injury to the rights of the petitioner would otherwise result.64 The existence
of an actual and substantial right to be protected is a prerequisite to the granting
of injunctive relief,65 and such relief should not be granted merely to compensate
for a completed wrong.66 In other words, an injunction should not be granted for
the purpose of punishment, but only to prevent a future wrong. 7 Rights already
Lenox Labs., Inc., 120 F. Supp. 42 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 217 F.2d 648 (3d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955); Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide
Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949); Kesses v. Eastman Kodak Co., 82 U.S.P.Q. 13
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); Pennington Eng'r Co. v. Houde Eng'r Corp., 136 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 771 (1943) ; Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942); Kohioff v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.'N.Y.
1940); Gallowhur Chem. Corp. v. Schwerdle, 37 N.J. Super. 385, 117 A2d 416 (Ch. 1955).
61. There is a group of cases in which the defendant was found guilty of misappro-
priating trade secrets prior to issuance of a patent disclosing them. However, in those
cases the plaintiff was granted an accounting for profits during that period and no men-
tion was made of injunctive relief based on the breach of confidence. These cases cannot
properly be grouped with either the Conmar or Shellmar cases. E.g., Hoeltke v. C. M.
Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1936); Micek v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 135 U.S.P.Q. 220 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Thiberg v. Bach, 107 F. Supp.
639 (D.N.J. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 203 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1953).
62. See, e.g., Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 60 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd,
275 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960).
63. See, e.g., Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 156
(2d Cir. 1949).
64. Watkins v. Rupert, 224 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1955) (per curiam); Minden Syrup Co. v.
Applegate, 150 So. 421 (La. Ct. App. 1933); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter,
62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (C.P. 1952).
65. McCormick v. McCann, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 203, 94 N.E.2d 55 (C.P. 1950); Wise v.
McCanless, 183 Tenn. 107, 191 S.W.2d 169 (1945).
66. See authorities cited note 28 supra.
67. Walling v. T. Buettner & Co., 133 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 US. 771
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lost or wrongs already perpetrated cannot be corrected by injunction. 8 Moreover,
it has been established that an injunction should be modified where oppressive
or broader than necessary for plaintiff's protection, 9 and dissolved where the
reason for granting it no longer exists. 70
In the light of these principles, it should be clear that the Shellmar cases
cannot be harmonized with the Conmar line, since in the factual setting of each
the future rights of the plaintiff are the same. The Shellmar cases seem to ignore
the patent rights of the plaintiff and proceed instead on the theory of a contract,
express or implied. In so doing they imply a greater obligation than the parties
would have imposed themselves. In the Hyde case, for example, the duration of
the license agreement was to be measured by the life of any patents which may
have issued; yet the court issued a perpetual injunction. On the other hand, m-
willingness to extend the defendant's duty of secrecy beyond the life of the
secret, in the absence of an express promise, is the very core of the Coninar
cases.
71
If the "head start" theory has any validity at all, it should be more than satis-
fied by an injunction of a duration equal to the life of the patent. It seems that
the problem of the defendant's getting a "head start" was answered by the
decision in Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp.72 There, the court found that by
misappropriating the plaintiff's secret, the defendant was able to market his
product sooner than he could have if he had acquired his knowledge from plain-
tiff's later-issued patent. Unwilling to let the defendant profit by his wrongful
conduct, the court ordered him to account for those profits resulting from his
earlier marketing of the infringing product.73 Although such damages were
punitive in nature, it is within the powers of equity to assess punitive damages
as distinguished from a punitive injunction.74
The most recent Shellmar cases direct too much attention to the wrongful
(1943). Accord, General Leather Prods. Co. v. Luggage Union, 119 N.J. Eq. 432, 183 A.
165 (Ch.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 121 N.J. Eq. 101, 187 A. 582 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
68. See Walling v. T. Buettner & Co., supra note 67; Fidler v. Roberts, 41 F.2d 305
(7th Cir. 1930); J. C. McFarland Co. v. O'Brien, 6 F.2d 1016 (N.D. Ohio 1925).
69. See Mele v. Ryder, 8 App. Div. 2d 390, 188 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1st Dep't 1959), appeal
dismissed, 7 N.Y.2d 1027, 166 N.E.2d 859, 200 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1960); Zemel v. 1616 Corp.,
277 App. Div. 1098, 101 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't 1950) (per curiam).
70. See Consolidated Peoples Ditch Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 205 Cal. 54, 269 Pac.
915 (1928); Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1928).
71. E.g., Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 156
(2d Cir. 1949); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 637 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 651 (1942); Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 59 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
275 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960).
72. 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952).
73. Id. at 924. The Schreyer case was recently followed by the ninth circuit in Engle-
hard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 139 U.S.P.Q. 179 (9th Cir. 1963).
74. I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park So. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 461, 228 N.Y.S.2d
883 (1st Dep't 1962).
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conduct of the defendant; 75 they rely on the following language of Franke v.
Wiltschek: 76
Plaintiffs do not assert, indeed cannot assert, a property right in their development
such as would entitle them to exclusive enjoyment against the world. Theirs is not a
patent, but a trade secret. The essence of their action is not infringement, but breach
of faith. It matters not that defendants could have gained their knowledge from a
study of the expired patent and plaintiffs' publicly marketed product. The fact is
that they did not. Instead they gained it from plaintiffs via their confidential relation-
ship, and in so doing incurred a duty not to use it to plaintiffs' detriment. This
duty they have breached.77
That case involved an unpatented product, cotton sponges, and the defendants,
after learning of plaintiff's secret by fraudulently indicating a desire to sell
them for the plaintiff, tried to show that such secret was disclosed in an old
expired patent. As the above language indicates, the court held that the fact
the secret was disclosed in an expired patent did not defeat the plaintiff's right
to assert an interest in it as a trade secret.78
Here again, as previously pointed out, it is important to distinguish a patent
secured by the owner of the trade secret from one issued to a stranger. In the
latter case, the secret is not disclosed by its owner, and most likely would exist
unnoticed by the defendant in the absence of the confidential disclosure from
the plaintiff. The Shellmar cases have failed to make this distinction. Instead,
they quote the above passage out of context and intimate that it is on all
fours with the case at bar. In this way, the Sheilmar cases have justified punish-
ing the wrongdoer.
It is curious that the decision in the Franke case by Judge Clark, who con-
curred in both Conmar and Schreyer, has been so continuously construed to
support a view opposite to that espoused by those cases. That Judge Clark
considered that the facts in the Franke case presented a different question from
those in a case involving a later patent issued to the plaintiff, is evident from
his failure to cite Connuir, A. 0. Smith, or Sheilmar in a rather thorough review
of trade secret cases. The distinction arises from the issuance of the patent to
the plaintiff disclosing his alleged secret.
It is not surprising that a court of equity would go out of its way to protect
a secret for a plaintiff whose only rights depend upon its existence. Thus, in
cases involving a prior disclosure, as in the Olsen patent of the Shdlmar case
or the expired patent of the Franke case, the courts do not allow a defendant to
defeat the plaintiff's rights by showing that the information was available
elsewhere. In those cases, it should be remembered, the discovery of the prior
patent and recognition of its significance was greatly aided, if not made possi-
ble in the first place, by the confidential disclosure.
75. See Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 18 N.J. 467, 473, 114 A.2d
438, 441 (1955) ; Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 583, 314 S.V.2d 763, 774-75 (1958);
Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Ore. 139, 157-59, 374 P.2d 912, 921-22 (1962).
76. 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953).
77. Id. at 495.
78. But see Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 257 (1945).
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Similarly, in a case where the defendant asserts that he could have learned
the plaintiff's secrets from an inspection of the publicly sold product, the courts
are reluctant to let the wrongdoer defeat the plaintiff's only remaining rights.79
Having learned the subtleties of a design in confidence, the defendant cannot
prove that he would have recognized them on mere inspection; and any doubts
in this matter are always resolved against the defendant.8 0 This rule is not
founded solely on a desire to penalize a wrongdoer. An understanding of allow-
able tolerances, safety factors employed and running clearances required are
often important to the success of the machine, but rarely discernible by in-
spection. Thus, the defendant is not allowed to show that he could have found
the secret, when the plaintiff has told him where to look. The rule of these
cases has been restricted to complicated mechanisms, however; a simple secret,
easily observed on the face of a product, is not so protected. 81
It is important to note, in those cases where the defendant asserts that he
could have learned the secret from an old patent or from products in public
use, that the plaintiff actually asserts the continued existence of a secret. On the
other hand, in the case of an issued patent, the disclosure is required by statute
to be "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art ... to make and use the same .... "8 Under such conditions,
the patentee is hardly in a position to urge that the subject matter is still secret.
There is a valid basis for distinction between cases concerning publication by
patent and those in which publication is by public use and sale. In the case of a
patent, the plaintiff has taken affirmative action inconsistent with a desire to
maintain his secret, such action being under a statutory compulsion to disclose
fully if at all. In the public-use-and-sale case, the plaintiff has taken only that
action necessary to exploit his secret, and he did so in the hopes that others
would be unable to duplicate it. Thus, in one case the plaintiff has surrendered
any right to secrecy, while in the other he hopes to retain it. The courts, then,
have a basis in the public-use-and-sale cases for giving continued protection to
the secret, unless it is plainly disclosed and discoverable on mere inspection. If
the plaintiff desires to retain his secret, although it is publicly exploited, surely
one who has obtained it in confidence should not be allowed to defeat it. Such
a basis for future protection is lacking where the plaintiff has disclosed and
claimed his secret in a patent.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts in the Shellmar line have been overzealous in their protection of
confidential disclosures. The result has been that many businessmen, realizing
this attitude of the courts, are reluctant to accept suggestions in confidence
79. See, e.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 36, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889).
80. See Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 673 (1936).
81. See Northup v. Reish, 200 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1953); cf. K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co.
v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W. 2d 782 (1958).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1958). See also United States Patent Office Rules of Practice, Rule
71, 37 C.F.R. § 1.171 (1960).
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